

## Lessons Learned in Mongolia, Vietnam, etc.

Lima, Peru November 9, 2017 Dr. Jerry Skees

#### GlobalAgRisk Involvement Index Insurance Programs

Early work on weather index insurance for the World Bank in Nicaragua, Morocco, Ethiopia and India

- 1. Mongolia Index Based Livestock Insurance using Gov't estimates of mortality rate
- 2. Vietnam Drought using rainfall station data in the early season as a form of business interruption for extra irrigation cost for coffee in the Central Highlands
- 3. Vietnam Flood using a river gauge on the Cambodian border
- 4. Peru El Nino Forecast Insurance using NOAA Nino 1.2 sea surface temperatures to trigger early payments before flooding begins in Northern Peru
- 5. Indonesia Earthquake index insurance using USGS intensity mapping



# Index-based Livestock Insurance Project, Mongolia





#### Mongolia — Index-based Livestock Insurance

#### The Risk

Severe livestock losses due to dzud (harsh winter weather)

## **Target Users**

Herders

#### **Contract Structure**

Payments based on livestock mortality rates at the soum (county) level

### Mongolia Parliament Passed IBLI Law in 2014

The structure was institutionalized in 2014

# IBLI Experience

- Started in 2005 3 aimags
- IBLI Law passed in 2014
- 2010 Major event (maybe 1 in 50) payout avg about USD 360 on premium of USD 50
- Herders largely understand the product

Year	Herders		Premium	A	Average
2013	19,445	¥	1,799,000,000	¥	92,517
2014	14,331	¥	1,374,000,000	¥	95,876
2015	10,346	¥	1,317,000,000	¥	127,296

# Layering Risk

There are two thresholds that are fixed for each aimag (province)

T1 is Threshold 1 (5, 6, or 7 percent)

T2 is Threshold 2 (25 or 30)

Layer 1: Below T1 –Herder assumes all losses

Layer 2: From T1 to T2 –Risk is fully priced and premium is used to fund payments from Mongolian Insurance Companies via a Livestock Insurance Pool

Layer 3: Above T2 – Gov't pays for the catastrophic layer as a subsidy

If MR > T1 payment rate = (MR1 - T1)

# Index-based Livestock Insurance — Risk Layering A New Model for Public-Private Partnerships

100% mortality Subsidy layer **Government Subsidy** A layer of very infrequent risk where Paid by government via decision makers may have a cognitive Risk pooling and failure problem reinsurance 30% mortality **Commercial Layer** Commercial Fully financed by herder premium Insurance Layer 6% mortality If the government can't continue to Retained by pay for extreme losses, the **Herders** commercial layer can continue


### Adding a Savings Layer to Motivate Renewals

Government Subsidy
Paid by government via
Risk pooling and
reinsurance

Commercial Insurance Layer

**Herder Savings Layer** 

Retained by Herders



The layer from 10 to 30 would have reduced premiums approximately 1/3. This would be used for savings in a 3 year contract.

The idea was rejected for its complexity.

My view remains that this is something worth pursuing when there is a public-private partnership.

Savings for frequent events is superior to insurance

#### Layering the and risk pooling proved to be more efficient

MR Layer	Expect loss	Loaded Prem	% of 5 to 30
5 to 10	0.76%	1.06%	34.3%
10 to 30	0.68%	2.03%	41.7%
5 to 30	1.44%	3.09%	100.0%
5 to 100	1.63%	4.87%	157.6%

Notes: Saving Layer is about 1/3 cost of the commerical layer: Had IBLIP offered cover to 100% the cost would have been about 50 percent more. The Gov't pool for 30 to 100 was reinsured at a cost of about 10% of commerical layer






### Vietnam: Early Flooding on Mekong Using Tan Chau




- Tan Chau—on the Mekong close to Vietnam/Cambodia border
- Water levels between Kratie and Tan Chau are 95% correlated during our critical time period
  - Proxy and data check


#### Water Levels at Kratie to Tan Chau




# Three Day Centered Moving Average of Daily Average Water Levels during Six Extreme Water Level Years (June 20–July 15)







# Rice Harvest Progression, 1999-2005, Dong Thap Business Interruption in Slowing Rice Harvest





#### **Lessons Learned**

- Weather stations are not well suited for index insurance
- Basis Risk Matters
- The regulatory environment is important / index insurance is contingent claim
- Delivery systems can be costly
- Reinsurance for first efforts can be costly
- Demand is challenging
- Pilot programs are difficult to scale
- Developing products that pay frequently is ill-advised

#### Index Insurance to Facilitate Financing Needs

- By framing Index Insurance as a form of contingent claims insurance, the legal and regulatory risk can be mitigated and issues tied to basis risk can be presented in a better fashion
- Contingent claims is similar to life insurance or insurance for a surgeon to protect loss eye sight – given an event that is well described, the burden is on the insured to select the financing needs (or level of coverage)
- Mongolia Herders who work to save their animals also incur significant expense
- Vietnam Rainfall insurance was presented to cover extra costs of irrigation that came prior to the onset of rain after coffee bloomed
- Vietnam Early flooding was identified as a condition that greatly slowed the harvest




#### Lesson's Learned Fit for Overcoming Market Barriers

CHALLENGE	GP'S APPROACH	
Inadequate Data	Proprietary risk hazard platform tailored to market needs	
Immature Legal & Regulatory Frameworks	Target risk aggregators domiciled in developed markets	
High Cost of New Products	Build risk management solutions that provide efficient balance of risk transfer and risk retention for clients; Work with meso-level clients that have scale and geographic diversity	
Insufficient Demand/Familiarity with Insurance	"High-touch" partnership approach that focuses on comprehensive strategies for managing business interruptions from extreme events	

Global Parametrics is designed to crowd the market in



#### Data: GP will use Global Circulation Models (GCMs)



#### **GP's Value Proposition**

